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Defense and the environment is not an either–or proposition. To choose between them
is impossible in this real world of serious defense threats and genuine environmental
concerns. The real choice is whether we are going to build a new environmental ethic
into the daily business of defense.
—Dick Cheney, Former Vice President and then–Secretary of Defense2
For several decades, and in a variety of contexts, national security and
environmental protection interests have clashed.3 Balancing these competing
concerns is a challenging task.4 However, in the wake of the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, the U.S. government “drastically changed its approach
to how it handled important environmental concerns in relation to national
defense issues.”5
1 Associate Professor of Law, Florida A & M University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Michelle McDonald, Giselle Peruyera, Marquita Booker, Mark Silberstein,
Natalia Gove, Luke Waters, Bette Collazo, Andrea Perez, Farnaz Ghaffari, and Danielle Murray in
preparing this article. The article was supported by a research grant from Florida A & M University
College of Law.
2 Stephen Dycus, NEPA Secrets, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 300 (1993) (quoting Defense Secretary Dick
Cheney, Address to Defense and Environmental Initiative Forum (Sept. 3, 1990)).
3 For a discussion of the tension between environmental protection and military interests in various
contexts, see generally Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and
Present Danger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105 (2007); Marcilynn A. Burke, Green Peace? Protecting Our
National Treasures While Providing for Our National Security, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 803 (2008); Jason C. Wells, National Security and the Endangered Species Act: A Fresh Look at
the Exemption Process and the Evolution of Army Environmental Policy, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 255 (2006); Comment, Exempting Department of Defense From Federal Hazardous Waste
Laws: Resource Contamination as “Range Preservation,” 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 647 (2005).
4 Julie G. Yap, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding Environmental Stewardship Out of the Riptide of National
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The most common manifestation of the tensions between national secu-
rity and environmental protection objectives is the Navy’s use of sonar in U.S.
waters. The oceans that surround the United States on both coasts provide the
U.S. Navy with an indispensable buffer zone in which to test and implement
national security objectives. Advancing these important objectives for the
safety and welfare of the nation’s citizens must, however, be tempered by the
equally compelling need for vigilant stewardship of marine living resources.
Marine mammals are particularly vulnerable to underwater noise intru-
sion associated with the Navy’s national security operations.6 Already imper-
iled by a variety of other anthropogenic influences, the safety and sustainability
of marine mammals hangs precariously in the balance if national security ob-
jectives are advanced without due regard for the viability of these species. The
integration of the new environmental ethic into the daily business of defense
to which then–Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney alluded remains a largely
unfulfilled promise with regard to the Navy’s use of sonar.
The Navy’s enhanced use of sonar is part of a larger trend of increasingly
aggressive use of national security measures in the post-9/11 world.7 This state
of heightened vigilance has taken its toll on marine mammals. The Navy’s use
of low frequency active sonar generates “one of the loudest sounds that human
beings can make in the water.”8 To make matters worse, these low frequency
sounds can travel for hundreds of miles.9 Although mass strandings of whales
have been linked to the Navy’s use of mid-frequency active sonar,10 the Navy
contends that its use of widely deployed low-frequency active sonar does not
pose such a risk.11 Environmental groups strongly contest this assertion and
have challenged the Navy’s use of low frequency sonar in a series of cases in
the past decade, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Winter
v. NRDC.12
Part 1 of this article considers the importance of the Navy’s use of
sonar to promote national security objectives and reviews the impacts that
this practice has on marine mammals. Part 2 provides a brief history of
6 For a discussion of the impacts of Navy sonar on marine mammals, see infra Part I.B.
7 See generally Stephen Dycus, Osama’s Submarine: National Security and Environmental Protection
after 9/11, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2008).
8 Humane Society of the United States, Sonar: Acoustic Harassment, available at http://www.hsus.org/
marine mammals/what are the issues/noise pollution and acoustic harassment/sonar acoustic harass
ment.htmlhttp://www.hsus.org/marine mammals/what are the issues/noise pollution and acoustic ha
rassment/sonar acoustic harassment.html (last visited June 25, 2010) [hereinafter Sonar: Acoustic
Harassment].
9 Id.
10 See Cat Lazaroff, U.S. Navy Admits Its Sonar Killed Whales, LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR.NET,
http://www.lfas.net/usnavyadmitsitssonarkilledwhales.htm
11 See Sonar: Acoustic Harassment, supra note 8.
































































cases under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)13 challenging the
Navy’s use of sonar and its impacts on marine mammals. It also addresses
the emergency exception under NEPA and how the Navy’s assertion of this
exception set the stage for the conflict in Winter v. NRDC. Part 3 addresses
the U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Winter and considers the
unanswered questions that remain in its wake. Part 4 proposes possible future
directions for regulating Navy sonar in the wake of Bush era national security
policies. It concludes that the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) should
be amended to include a citizen suit provision to enhance protection of marine
mammals from the effects of ocean noise in a manner that does not undermine
national security objectives. It also endorses the need for additional substantive
safeguards such as regional cooperation and safe havens for marine mammals
in new legislation and regulations that go beyond the piecemeal “temporary
fix” of protection for marine mammals that can be secured in a successful
NEPA challenge.
1. NAVY SONAR AND MARINE MAMMALS
Navy sonar is an important tool to promote national security, especially in the
post-9/11 world; however, sonar has devastating impacts on marine mammals.
This part of the article explores the role that sonar plays in promoting national
security and considers the types and extent of impacts that this practice has
on marine mammals.
1.1 Navy Sonar as a Tool to Promote National Security
Sound is a vital means through which safety in the marine environment is
promoted. This principle holds true not only for the oceans’ inhabitants but
also for promoting the Navy’s national security objectives.14 “The Navy is
charged with maintaining, training, and equipping combat-ready naval forces
capable of winning wars, deterring aggression, and ensuring freedom of the
seas.”15
An essential component of the Navy’s responsibility is anti-submarine
warfare.16 The navies of potential adversary nations already possess
13 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006).
14 Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond Winter v. NRDC: A Decade of Litigation the Navy’s Active Sonar Around
the Environmental Exemptions, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2009) [hereinafter Craig].
15 Paul C. Kiamos, National Security and Wildlife Protection: Maintaining an Effective Balance, 8 ENVTL.
L. 457, 481–482 (2002).
16 The Marine Mammal Protection Act and Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency
Active Sonar: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of
the House Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. 3–4 (2001) [hereinafter House Comm. on Resources
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approximately 200 diesel-electric submarines.17 These submarines “possess
tactical characteristics that are extremely difficult to counter—stealth and
lethality.”18 If able to penetrate U.S. or multinational task force defenses, these
submarines “could undermine military efforts to thwart hostile enemy forces,
and could change the balance of political support for U.S. involvement in an
armed conflict.”19
To respond to these threats, the Navy has used sound navigation and rang-
ing (“sonar”) to track submarines.20 For the Navy to effectively engage in com-
bat at sea, sonar is necessary for both offensive and defensive tactics.21 Sonar
employs sound to “help ships and submarines navigate and communicate”22
and “determine water depths, presence of vessels, and the location of mines.”23
Sonar is used in three contexts. The first and most important use of sonar
occurs in military engagement. The Navy also uses sonar to ensure national
security objectives. Third, and most controversially, the Navy conducts reg-
ular and rigorous testing of sonar systems to ensure readiness for military
engagement and national security objectives. It is the “testing to ensure readi-
ness” aspect of the Navy’s sonar use that has generated the most controversy
regarding the impacts on marine mammals. Few would question that military
engagement must take priority over threats to marine mammals; however,
the preparation for those military engagement scenarios can and should be
conducted in a manner that is more sensitive and responsive to the needs of
marine mammals.
There are two basic types of sonar: passive and active.24 Passive sonar
“receives transmissions of sound and is primarily used to detect the presence
of submarines and other objects,”25 whereas active sonar “both receives and
17 “Encroachment Issues” Having a Potentially Adverse Impact on Military Readiness: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Readiness and Management Support of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 107th
Cong. 11 (2001) [hereinafter Senate Armed Services Comm. Hearing] (statement of Vice Admiral
James F. Amerault, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness and Logistics). Congressional
testimony reveals that “potential adversaries, including China, North Korea, and Iran, have developed
ultra-quiet diesel-electric sub[marines].” Robert McClure, Tests on Marine Mammals to Look for Sonar
Link to Injuries, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 12, 2003, at A1.
18 Id. Despite the end of the Cold War, the submarine threat remains real and in some ways has become
more challenging. Of the approximately 500 non-U.S. submarines in the world, 224 are operated by
non-allied nations. House Comm. on Resources Hearings, supra note 16, at 4.
19 Id. at 4–5.
20 Id. at 2.
21 CC Vassar, NRDC v. Winter: Is NEPA Impeding National Security Interests?, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 279, 280 (2009) [hereinafter Vassar].
22 Id.


































































transmits sound.”26 Active sonar transmits “pings” of sound.27 A sonar operator
then listens for the echo of the sound, which allows the operator to measure the
size of the object from which the sound bounced and to measure the distance
between the operator and the object.”28
The Navy has three types of active sonar systems.29 First, Mid-Frequency
Active Sonar (MFAS), which the Navy has been using since World War II,
employs frequencies of one to ten kilohertz (kHz) and typically can detect
objects one to ten nautical miles away.”30 “Second, Low-Frequency Active
Sonar (LFAS) uses sound frequencies of less than 1 kHz, which suffer less
attenuation in seawater and hence allow the Navy to detect objects up to
100 nautical miles away.”31 “Third, the Navy uses its Surveillance Towed
Array Sensor System (SURTASS) LFAS system for long-range search and
surveillance of submarines,32 and it would like to employ that system in at
least 75% of the world’s oceans.”
“At the source, low-frequency active sonar projects at an approximate
level of 215 dB, although it is contended that at the convergence zones where
the signals begin to combine, the acoustic level can reach 240 dB.”33 These
levels far exceed the sound emitted by a Concorde jet at takeoff.34
1.2 Harmful Effects of Sonar on Marine Mammals
Marine mammals depend on sound much like humans depend on sight.35 Unim-
paired hearing is indispensable for the most basic functions in marine mam-
mals, such as communication, individual recognition, predator avoidance,
prey detection and capture, orientation, navigation, mate selection, and
26 Vassar, supra note 21 at 286.
27 A “ping” is a complete sequence of sound transmission. See Taking and Importing Marine Mammals:
Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Navy Operations of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System
Low Frequency Active Sonar, 67 Fed. Reg. 46712, 46712 (July 16, 2002) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 216) [hereinafter Final Rule].
28 Vassar, supra note 21, at 286.




33 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 46712; see also Letter from Joel Reynolds & Michael Jasny, Senior
Attorney and Project Associate (respectively), Natural Resources Defense Council, to Donna Wieting,
Chief, Marine Mammal Conservation Division of the National Marine Fisheries Service (May 31,
2001), available at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/cjrmj0501.asp
34 See Taffy Lee Williams, High Intensity Military Sonar: Ocean Patrol or Killing Machine?, N.Y.
Whale & Dolphin Action League, 2002, available at http://www.ny4whales.org/sonar.htmlProfile (“The
[Concorde] SuperSonic [jet] at take off is 150 db.”) Remarkably, LFA sonar has a sound pressure level
of approximately 140 dB when it is more than 400 miles from the vessel. NRDC v. Evans, 364 F. Supp.
2d 1083, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
35 Joel R. Reynolds, Submarines, Sonar, and the Death of Whales: Enforcing the Delicate Balance of
Environmental Compliance and National Security in Military Training, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
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mother–offspring bonding.36 Sound is how marine mammals find their way
through the world every day.37
Marine mammals’ reliance on sound for survival has made these species
vulnerable to the Navy’s use of sonar. Human-generated sound was not known
as a potential threat to marine mammals until the 1970s.38 In recent years, the
harmful effects of human-generated sound on marine life have become a
subject of great concern in matters concerning national defense.39
Widely used by the Navy for decades and currently on over 50 per-
cent of its vessels, mid-frequency active sonar has been linked to numerous
whale strandings throughout the world.40 The link between the Navy’s use
of mid-frequency sonar and marine mammal mortality has been conclusively
established.41 In fact, the Navy’s own consultants concluded that “the evidence
of sonar causation is, in our opinion, completely convincing and that therefore
there is a serious issue of how best to avoid/minimize future beaching events.”42
Strandings have occurred throughout the world, “with stranded animals found
with bleeding around the brain, emboli in the lungs, and lesions in the liver
and kidneys, symptoms resembling a severe case of decompression sickness,
or “the bends.”43 Worse still, strandings of whales may represent “only the tip
of the iceberg,”44 because these injuries occur at sea and substantially larger
numbers may be dying offshore.45
36 MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS, MARINE MAMMALS AND NOISE: A SOUND APPROACH TO
RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT i (2007), http://mmc.gov/reports/workshop/pdf/fullsoundreport.pdf
37 Lethal Sounds: The Use of Military Sonar Poses a Deadly Threat to Whales and Other Marine Mammals,
available at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sonar.asp
38 MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 147 (2008), http://
mmc.gov/reports/annual/pdf/2008annualreport.pdf [hereinafter MARINE MAMMAL ANNUAL REPORT].
39 Id.
40 See Reynolds, supra note 35 at 763–68.
41 Id. at 762. “A range of experts, from the International Whaling Commission’s (“IWC”) Scientific
Committee to the U.S. Navy’s own commissioned scientists, have agreed that the evidence linking mass
strandings to mid-frequency sonar is “convincing” and “overwhelming.” Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See Letter from Joel Reynolds, Senior Attorney and Dir., Marine Mammal Protection Project, NRDC, to
the Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy, Dep’t of the Navy 7 (July 2, 2004), available
at http://www.nrdc.org/media/docs/040714.pdf
In addition to strandings and non-auditory injuries, the harmful effects of mid-frequency sonar
may include temporary or permanent loss of hearing, which impairs an animal’s ability to
communicate, avoid predators, and detect and capture prey; avoidance behavior, which can
lead to abandonment of habitat or migratory pathways, and disruption of important behaviors
such as mating, feeding, nursing, or migration; aggressive (or agonistic) behavior, which can
result in injury; masking of biologically meaningful sounds, such as the call of predators or


































































The most notorious example of these impacts involved the mass strand-
ings of whales and other marine mammals linked to the Navy’s use of mid-
frequency sonar.46
[I]n March 2000, sixteen whales from at least three different species stranded over
150 miles of shoreline along the northern channels of the Bahamas. These beachings
occurred within twenty-four hours of U.S. Navy ships using mid-frequency sonar in
those same channels. Post-mortem examinations found, in every whale examined,
hemorrhaging in and around the ears and other tissues related to sound conduction
or production, such as the larynx and auditory fats, some of which was debilitative
and potentially severe. It is now accepted that these mortalities were caused, through
an unknown mechanism, by the Navy’s use of mid-frequency sonar.”47
Although these strandings have mostly involved whales, other cetacean
species have also stranded in connection with the Navy’s use of sonar.48 “Pos-
sible triggers for the strandings include a behavioral response that causes
deep divers to alter their diving behavior, which then results in decompression
sickness-like impacts.”49
Public awareness of the impacts of ocean noise grew stronger in 1995
when, after urging from NRDC, the Navy disclosed the development of SUR-
TASS LFAS. After a five-year administrative review process, including a
programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), a Navy-sponsored
scientific research program using the LFA system at significantly reduced
source levels, and tens of thousands of public comments opposed to the pro-
posed deployment, NMFS issued a Final Rule. This rule granted a “small
take” permit pursuant to the MMPA allowing the Navy to seek and obtain
annual authorization to use LFA in 75 percent of the world’s oceans. NRDC
and others once again sued.50 The war against the Navy’s use of sonar was in
full swing.
A flashpoint of controversy in the past decade, the Navy’s use of SUR-
TASS LFAS “can affect marine mammals across hundreds of miles because
of the power and intensity of the sound waves.” 51 This noise “can agitate nerve
endings deep within the skin or cause gas bubbles to form in the gastroin-
testinal tract, even at long distances, around the Navy’s LFA sonar system.”52
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 E.C.M PARSONS ET AL., MARINE POLLUTION BULLETIN 56, NAVY SONAR AND CETACEANS: JUST HOW





52 MICHAEL JASNEY, SOUNDING THE DEPTHS II: THE RISING TOLL OF SONAR, SHIPPING, AND INDUSTRIAL OCEAN
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In addition, the use of this sonar “can cause the air-filled tissue in the lungs
to vibrate sympathetically, a condition called resonance that, in its extreme
form, may lead to hemorrhaging.”53
The sounds emitted by SURTASS LFAS “overlap with sounds used by
large whales and may affect their hearing, physiology, or behavior.”54 The
harmful effects of the Navy’s use of SURTASS LFAS include potential mask-
ing of marine mammals’ ability to hear natural sounds at similar frequencies,
including calls from conspecifics,55 echolocation,56 sounds of ondontocetes,57
and environmental sounds such as surf noise.”58
2. NEPA CHALLENGES TO NAVY SONAR
This section addresses the evolution of NEPA litigation involving Navy sonar
and the role of NEPA’s emergency exception in this context. For a variety of
reasons, NEPA has been the most widely used and most successful weapon
for environmental groups’ challenges to Navy sonar. As these cases illustrate,
however, the Navy is well insulated procedurally and substantively from
challenges to its use of sonar. In most instances, the Navy “wins the war” in
these cases by being able to proceed with its plans to use sonar, even if it loses
some of the legal skirmishes along the way.
2.1 Evolution of NEPA Sonar Cases
Prior to the long line of NEPA cases challenging Navy sonar from the late
1990s to the present, the first ocean noise pollution case was filed under
NEPA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) in 1994. In Natural
Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Department of the Navy, NRDC and other
environmental organizations sought to enjoin the implementation of a National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) regulation that authorized the taking of
marine mammals over a five-year period pursuant to the Navy’s weapons-
testing program.59 NRDC sought to enjoin the Navy from conducting a “ship-
shock” trial, a five-year underwater explosives program proposed for waters in
and around the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary off the Southern
California coast.60 The ship-shock program was proposed to occur in an area
of recognized marine mammal aggregation and species diversity.61
53 Id.
54 MARINE MAMMAL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38 at 19.
55 “Conspecifics” refers to other organisms of the same species.
56 “Echolocation” is biological sonar used by cetaceans.
57 “Ondontocetes” are toothed whales.
58 See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004).
59 857 F. Supp. 734, 735–37 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
60 Id. at 735.































































NMFS prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) under NEPA,
which concluded that the program would have no significant impact on the
environment.62 NMFS issued a Final Rule under the MMPA approving the five-
year testing program and requiring the Navy, as a precondition to the testing,
to obtain a Letter of Authorization for each test.63 Based on another EA, the
Navy then sought and received a Letter of Authorization for a ship-shock
test.64
The court granted the injunction and held that the plaintiffs demonstrated
a near-certain likelihood of prevailing on the merits on their claims that the
challenged regulation and the challenged letter of authorization each violated
the MMPA and NEPA primarily because the NMFS and the Navy both failed
to adequately consider possible alternative sites for the planned ship-shock
trial.65 In addition, the court concluded that it was sufficiently likely that
further surveying and consideration would locate an alternate area that would
result in the taking of fewer marine mammals and other animals.66 As a result,
the court determined that the failure to issue this injunction would result
in irreparable harm.67 The court noted that “[a]ny other interpretation of the
MMPA would allow NMFS to authorize projects that would result in the
taking of an unnecessarily high number of marine mammals.”68
This successful ocean noise suit under NEPA laid a foundation for a
long line of subsequent NEPA-based challenges to the Navy’s use of sonar
and its impacts on marine mammals. NEPA challenges to the Navy’s use
of sonar began in the late-1990s and have continued to the present. Two
of these cases involved unsuccessful challenges to Navy sonar in Hawaii.
First, in Ocean Mammal Institute v. Cohen, the plaintiffs filed suit under
NEPA and the MMPA to enjoin the Departments of the Navy, Commerce, and
Defense’s ongoing tests of low-frequency active sonar adjacent to the west
coast of Hawaii.69 The plaintiffs contended that the NMFS violated NEPA
when it issued a permit for the testing.70 The Court held that the NMFS
did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in issuing the permit for
the research project, and that the Navy and the NMFS did not act in an




65 Id. at 737.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 740.
68 Id. at 738. Faced with a similar factual scenario, the post-9/11 Supreme Court struck a very different
balance between national security and environmental protection concerns in its 2008 decision in Winter.
See infra Part III.2.
69 Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Cohen, No. 98-CV-160, 1998 WL 2017631, at ∗1 (D. Haw. Mar. 9, 1998), aff’d
164 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 1998).
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would not have a significant impact on the environment.71 The court denied
the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs
failed to show either a likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of
hardships tipped sharply in their favor and that they would suffer irreparable
harm.72
In another challenge to the Navy’s use of sonar in waters off the coast
of Hawaii, the plaintiffs in Hawaii County Green Party v. Clinton sought
injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the Navy’s use of low-frequency
active sonar tests and research in that area.73 Following the court’s dismissal of
this initial action,74 the plaintiffs filed another action challenging the Navy’s
development and deployment of sonar defense systems under NEPA, the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the MMPA.75 The plaintiffs sought to re-
open the first case, and the Navy moved to dismiss the current case.76 The court
held that the claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and NEPA were
not ripe for review because they challenged an ongoing environmental impact
statement process concerning the deployment of sonar testing. The claim
under the MMPA was ripe, but plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim
because they had not alleged an injury in fact from the alleged procedural
violations.77 Therefore, the motion to reopen the case was denied and the
motion to dismiss was granted.78
In Cetacean Community v. Bush, a suit was filed in the name of the
cetacean community of whales, dolphins, and porpoises.79 The suit alleged
that the Navy’s proposed deployment of low frequency active sonar during a
time of heightened threat violated various environmental statutes.80 In granting
the government’s motion to dismiss, the court held that: (1) animals lacked
standing to sue under the ESA, the MMPA, and NEPA; (2) the claim that
the special system of deployment (SURTASS LFAS) violated the statutes
71 Id. at ∗6. These studies sought to measure the responses of humpback and sperm whales to bursts of
low-frequency sonar. Id. at ∗1.
72 Id. at ∗3.
73 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Haw. 2000).
74 Id. at 1173.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1191.
77 Id. at 1200.
78 Id. at 1194.
79 249 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Haw. 2003). The suit named “President George W. Bush as a defendant
‘in his capacity as a member of the National Command Authorities because the National Command
Authorities will determine when a threat or warfare condition exists.’ However, since the President is
not an ‘agency’ within the meaning of APA, Plaintiff cannot obtain judicial review under APA of its
claims that the President violated, or will violate, MMPA or NEPA.” Id. at 1213–14.
80 Id. at 1207. Both the small take application and the Navy’s Draft and Final EISs are specifically limited
to use of SURTASS LFA sonar during training, testing, and routine military operations and will not
cover use of the SURTASS LFA system in self-defense, in times of war, combat, or heightened threat































































was unripe for adjudication; and (3) the President of United States was not
amenable to suit.81
The court held that the plaintiff’s claims regarding SURTASS LFAS were
unripe for three reasons. First, there has been no final agency action for the
plaintiff to challenge since the defendants have not even proposed the use of
SURTASS LFAS in threat and warfare situations. Second, the plaintiff suffered
no hardship from an agency regulation, since no agency has promulgated
regulations dealing with the defendants’ use of SURTASS LFAS during threat
and warfare conditions. Third, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
its case is ripe because the defendants will likely avoid “compliance with
the three statutes until an emergency situation arises that precludes judicial
review of the failure to comply” as pure speculation, especially in light of
the defendants’ declaration that they plan to use SURTASS LFAS in “armed
conflict or direct combat support operations” or “during periods of heightened
threat conditions, as determined by the National Command Authorities.”82
This initial line of cases represents the “first wave” of ocean noise
challenges against the Navy. The “ship shock” case was a victory for the
environmental groups because the NMFS failed to consider alternatives. By
contrast, the next two cases failed because the issues were no longer ripe,
because the tests already had been conducted, and for lack of standing since
an animal could not sue. In the “second wave” of cases, suits challenged an
NMFS Final Rule in 2000, which granted a “small take” permit under the
MMPA “allowing the Navy to seek and obtain annual authorization to use
LFA in 75% of the world’s oceans.”83
In the first of this “second wave” of cases, NRDC v. U.S. Dept. of
Navy, NRDC challenged the Navy’s Littoral Warfare Advanced Development
Program (“LWAD”), a series of tests for the development of a broad range
of high-intensity active sonar devices.84 The plaintiffs alleged that the Navy
violated NEPA, the ESA, and the MMPA by treating each test as a separate,
individual activity, rather than analyzing the environmental impact of the series
as a programmatic whole.85 The court held that programmatic review of the
series of tests was not required because the tests were neither connected nor
cumulative and the Navy’s general planning of the program did not itself result
in an environmental impact or irreversible commitment of resources.86 The
court concluded that the Navy had chosen to conduct separate environmental
81 Cetacean Cmty., 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1211–1214.
82 Id. at 1207, 1212–13.
83 See Reynolds, supra note 35 at 775.
84 NRDC v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, No. CV-01-07781, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26360, at ∗6 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
17, 2002).
85 Id.
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assessments (EAs) and consultations based on the difficulty of treating the
series of tests as one program, not in an effort to avoid environmental review.87
In NRDC v. Evans, the plaintiffs claimed that the NMFS improperly
approved use of LFA in as much as 75 percent of the world’s oceans in violation
of the MMPA, ESA, and APA.88 The plaintiffs also claimed that the Navy
participated in the ESA violation and issued an inadequate EIS in violation
of NEPA and the APA. 89 The court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated that
the defendants should have considered training in areas that present a reduced
risk of harm to marine life and the marine environment when practicable,
and should have considered extending shutdown procedures beyond marine
mammals and sea turtles to schools of fish.90 The court held that the defendants’
alternatives analysis was arbitrary and capricious.91
The court granted the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction, holding that
the plaintiffs had established irreparable harm.92 The injunction was “carefully
tailored to reduce the risk to marine mammals and endangered species by
restricting the sonar’s use in areas that are particularly rich in marine life,
while still allowing the Navy to use this technology for testing and training
in a variety of oceanic conditions.”93 Furthermore, the injunction was only
to be in place “until the defendants correct the violations identified in this
opinion.”94 “After the injunction, the Navy entered into a settlement agreement
with the plaintiffs regarding low-frequency sonar, which restricted the Navy’s
use of sonar to a “defined and limited area of the western North Pacific
Ocean.”95
In Ocean Mammal Institute v. Gates, the plaintiffs sought declaratory
and injunctive relief against the Navy’s use of MFA sonar.96 The plaintiffs
claimed that the Navy violated NEPA by: (1) failing to provide the required
public notice and opportunity to comment on the first EA; (2) preparing EAs
that were substantively flawed and inadequate; (3) failing to prepare an EIS
for its undersea warfare exercises (USWEXs).97
87 Id. at ∗24.
88 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
89 Id. at 1137.
90 Id. at 1166.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1138.
93 Id. at 1191.
94 Id. See Natalie Barefoot-Watambwa, Who Is Encroaching on Whom? The Balance Between Our Naval
Security Needs and the Environment: The 2004 RRPI Provisions as a Response to Encroachment
Concerns, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 602 (2005).
95 Press Statement, National Resource Defense Council, Statement from Joel Reynolds, NRDC,
Regarding Navy LFA Settlement (Oct. 13, 2003), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/
pressreleases/031013a.asp
96 546 F. Supp. 2d 960, 963–68 (D. Haw. 2008).































































On February 2, 2007, the Navy issued its first Finding of No Significant
Impact (“First FONSI”) for its USWEXs.98 Subsequently, the Navy conducted
two USWEXs in April 2007, and two pygmy sperm whales washed up on
Hawaiian beaches.99 On October 15, 2007, the Navy issued a new EA (“Revised
EA”) and FONSI (“Revised FONSI”).100 The Revised EA clarified and revised
the First EA’s analysis of the CZMA and contained analysis of the potential
environmental impacts of USWEX based on the public comments received
on the First EA.101 The Navy determined that none of the comments altered
its January 2007 determination that its USWEXs would not have a significant
effect on the quality of the human environment.102 The Revised EA and FONSI
concluded that there was no threat of significant harm to the environment and,
thus, an EIS was not required.103
The Navy subsequently completed its long-planned Hawaii Range Com-
plex Final EIS/Overseas EIS, which covered all of the Navy’s future training
activities in the Hawaii Range Complex.104 Following the completion of the
EIS, the Navy moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim as moot.105 The court
dismissed the case as moot, holding that the Navy’s preparation of the EIS
superseded the challenged EA negative determinations.106
In NRDC, Inc. v. Gutierrez, NRDC and other environmental organiza-
tions claimed that the defendants, the Navy and the Department of Commerce
violated NEPA by: (1) failing to consider all reasonable alternatives to the
proposed deployment of SURTASS LFA; (2) failing to address or inappropri-
ately rejecting mitigation measures; and (3) failing to consider all reasonably
foreseeable individual and cumulative impacts of LFA.107 The plaintiffs chal-
lenged whether the failure to consider any form of a dual criteria108—in light
of the importance of the location of the continental shelf to the environmental
impact and the fact that the Navy has been operating under a dual criteria
for five years—constituted a violation of NEPA’s requirement to consider all
98 Id. at 965.
99 Id. at 966.




104 Id. at 963.
105 Ocean Mammal Institute v. Gates, No. 107CV00254 (D. Haw. Jan. 13, 2009).
106 Id. at 1.
107 2008 WL 360852, ∗1 (N.D. Cal.).
108 “Dual criteria” is a standard proposed by Roger Gentry of the National Marine Fisheries Service. He
explained that Low Frequency Active (LFA) sonar could be effective to detect submarines between 40
and 200 miles in most but not all cases. Therefore, “to account for vast variations in the width of the
continental shelf, [he] would suggest that the EIS have a dual criterion, such as ‘12 nmi from the shore,
OR the distance to the 300 m[eter] isobath, whichever is farther.”’ NRDC, Inc. v. Evans, 279 F. Supp.
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reasonable alternatives.109 The court held that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood
of succeeding on the issue of the defendants’ alleged failure to adequately ex-
amine designation of additional offshore biologically important areas and
issued an injunction.110
As the NEPA cases in this section reflect, environmental plaintiffs en-
joyed some success with NEPA challenges to Navy sonar; however, procedu-
ral obstacles precluded the plaintiffs from securing greater relief. Moreover,
NEPA is a procedural statute and litigation under it rarely results in enduring
substantive protections for marine mammals.
2.2. NEPA’s Emergency Exception
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Weinberger v. Catholic Action,111 a
case in which the Court rejected a NEPA challenge to a Navy construction
project, illustrates the degree of judicial deference to the military when the
issue of national security is raised in a NEPA case. In Catholic Action, the
Navy built 48 earth-covered magazines on Hawaii that had capabilities for
storing nuclear weapons.112 Actual nuclear storage at the site could not be
confirmed due to classification for national security reasons.113 No EIS was
prepared.114 The plaintiff sought an EIS that would analyze: “(1) the risk and
consequences of a nuclear accident, (2) the effect of a plane from nearby
Honolulu International Airport crashing into one of the magazines, and (3)
the hazard to local residents from low-level radiation.”115 The Ninth Circuit
ordered that the Navy prepare a hypothetical EIS for a facility capable of
storing nuclear weapons.116
The Supreme Court held that an EIS was not required because the Navy
was only contemplating storing nuclear weapons at the site; nuclear storage
was not actually proposed.117 The Court also stated that “ultimately, whether or
not the Navy has complied with NEPA ‘to the fullest extent possible’ is beyond
judicial scrutiny” because the trial would ultimately lead to the disclosure of
confidential information.118 Given this level of judicial deference to military
secrecy, the military’s assertion of a national security justification would
almost always eliminate NEPA’s effectiveness as a check on the military’s
decision-making process, even when the proposals and decisions may involve
109 NRDC v. Gutierrez, supra note 107 at ∗6.
110 Id. at ∗11.
111 Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
112 Id. at 141.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 142.
116 Id. at 140, 141.
































































major risks to the community and the environment where the proposed action
is to occur.
Despite the Supreme Court’s proclivity, as evidenced in Catholic Action,
for deference to the military’s national security objectives, NEPA’s emergency
exception is a mechanism for courts to properly balance the national security
and environmental protection concerns at issue in Navy sonar cases under
NEPA.119 Pursuant to Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations,
federal agencies may be allowed to take different steps to comply with their
NEPA obligations in the case of emergencies, provided that certain conditions
are met.120 The applicable language of the CEQ regulations provides:
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant
environmental impact without observing the provisions of these regulations, the
Federal agency taking the action should consult with the Council about alternative
arrangements. Agencies and the Council will limit such arrangements to actions
necessary to control the immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain
subject to NEPA review.121
Only four cases involving challenged to CEQ’s granting of alternative ar-
rangements under the emergency exception have led to published decisions.122
Courts have upheld the CEQ’s determination in all of these cases.123 The three
cases before Winter v. NRDC that challenged CEQ’s grant of alternative ar-
rangements differed from Winter because the cases dealt with emergency
exceptions backed by a satisfactory NEPA document, either before or after
the action.124 However, in Winter v. NRDC, the EA-FONSI was found to be
insufficient, and therefore there was no proper NEPA document.125
The first case to challenge the CEQ’s grant of an alternative arrange-
ment under the emergency exception was Crosby v. Young.126 In Crosby, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development was allowed to release fund-
ing prior to Detroit City Council’s completion of an EIS.127 CEQ applied the
emergency exception regulations because it determined that if loan approval
119 For a discussion of NEPA’s emergency exception and some of the challenges that courts have faced in
interpreting it, see generally Robert Orsi, Comment, Emergency Exceptions from NEPA: Who Should
Decide?, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF L. REV. 481 (1987).
120 Kristina Alexander, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, Whales and Sonar:
Environmental Exemptions for the Navy’s Mid-Frequency Active Sonar Training, February 18, 2009, at
4, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34403.pdf [hereinafter Alexander].
121 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2010). “According to CEQ, this provision has been requested just 41 times since
the regulations took effect in 1978.” Alexander, supra note 120 at 4.
122 Id. Alexander, supra note 120 at 4.
123 Id. at 10.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 512 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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were delayed, the project would risk cancellation, which would be detrimental
to the city and its citizens.128 The EIS was completed at a later date.129
National Audubon Society v. Hester130 involved a challenge to the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS’s) decision to take the last wild condors
into captivity in an effort to save the species.131 In the agency’s EA-FONSI,
the preferred alternative had been to leave some condors in the wild and
capture others.132 The district court held that there was no emergency because
FWS had reviewed the situation just months earlier in an EA133 ; however, the
D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in substituting its
judgment for the CEQ.134 The D.C. Circuit concluded that FWS had a rational
basis for changing its policy, especially given the lead poisoning death of a
condor.135 The court reasoned that once it had determined that the underlying
agency decision “reflects sufficient attention to environmental concerns and
is adequately reasoned and explained,” its review was complete.136
The last case to challenge CEQ’s grant of the alternative arrangement
under the emergency exception before Winter is important because the U.S.
Air Force sought the emergency exception.137 Unlike the two previous cases,
Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Vest laid the groundwork for the
military to request alternative arrangements to NEPA requirements under
the emergency exception to ensure military readiness.138 In Valley Citizens
for a Safe Environment v. Vest,139 a previously prepared EIS supported the
decision that flights would not occur from the base between the hours of 10
p.m. and 7 a.m.”140 With the U.S. commitment of forces to Operation Desert
Storm, however, the Air Force began 24-hour operations from the base.141 The
plaintiffs requested that the Air Force prepare a supplemental EIS prior to the
flights, but the Air Force sought alternative arrangements from the CEQ.142
CEQ allowed the flights to continue and allowed the Air Force to prepare an
EA within the year.143 In evaluating whether the Air Force or CEQ had been
128 Id. at 10.
129 Id. at 11.
130 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y. v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1986).





136 801 F.2d at 407.
137 Id. at 11.
138 Id.
139 1991 WL 330963 (D. Mass. May 6, 1991).
140 Id. at 2. Alexander, supra note 119, at 11.
141 Id.
142 Id.































































arbitrary and capricious in allowing the emergency exception under these
circumstances, the court concluded that the crisis in the Middle East was an
emergency.144
In NRDC v. Winter,145 the CEQ approved alternative arrangements for
the Navy to comply with NEPA because it had determined that emergency
circumstances prevented normal compliance.146 The CEQ had concluded that
the district court’s injunction imposed training restrictions on the Navy that
caused a “significant and unreasonable risk that Strike Groups will not be able
to train and be certified as fully mission capable.”147 Accordingly, the CEQ
allowed the Navy to continue its exercises pending completion of the EIS.148
Upon adopting the alternative arrangements and determining that it would
comply with them,149 the Navy sought to vacate the district court’s preliminary
injunction in light of the CEQ’s actions.150 The district court denied the Navy’s
motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.151 The Ninth Circuit held that there
was a serious question whether the CEQ’s interpretation of the emergency
circumstances regulation was lawful.”152
The Supreme Court in Winter v. NRDC did not address the issue of CEQ’s
authority to issue an alternative arrangement under these circumstances. How-
ever, in her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote that CEQ lacked the
authority to absolve an agency of its statutory duty to prepare an EIS. Notably,
Justice Ginsburg reasoned in this regard that “if the Navy sought to avoid its
NEPA obligations, its remedy lay in the Legislative Branch. The Navy’s alter-
native course—rapid, self-serving resort to an office in the White House—is
surely not what Congress had in mind when it instructed agencies to comply
with NEPA “to the fullest extent possible.”153 Therefore, in Winter v. NRDC, the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret NEPA’s emergency exception
in a manner that would promote equitable balancing between national security
concerns and marine mammal impacts from Navy sonar. Unfortunately, the
Court’s decision fell far short of fulfilling that expectation.
3. WINTER v. NRDC: SALT IN THE WOUNDS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. NRDC made a bad situation worse
for environmental groups seeking to use NEPA as a weapon to protect marine
mammals from Navy sonar impacts. The Court’s decision, with its emphasis
144 Id. at ∗5.
145 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1229–30 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
146 Id. at 1224.
147 Id.
148 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 662–663 (9th Cir. 2008).
149 Id. at 663.
150 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365, 367 (2008).
151 Id.
152 Id.
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on the irreparable harm standard for preliminary injunctions, empowers the
courts, rather than Congress and the agencies, to determine the degree of
protection for marine mammals. This interpretation weakened the effect of
NEPA litigation for Navy sonar impacts. To the extent that NEPA litigation
remains a potentially viable avenue in this context, the Court also failed to
address the scope of the emergency circumstances exception under NEPA as
it relates to national security justifications for Navy sonar.
3.1. Lower Court Decisions
In NRDC v. Winter, NRDC sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Navy for its planned use of mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar in training
exercises.154 The Navy was conducting MFA sonar training exercises off the
coast of Southern California, home to 37 species of marine mammals poten-
tially imperiled by this practice.155 NRDC filed the action alleging that the
Navy violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS.156
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
issued the injunction on the grounds that (1) the Navy failed to prepare an EIS
as required by NEPA, and (2) the Navy failed to take into account its use of
MFA when it submitted its consistency determination to the California Coastal
Commission as required by the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).157
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs would more than likely succeed
on the merits of the case because irreparable harm would result if the injunction
were not granted.158
The Navy appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which re-
manded the decision to the district court to impose injunctive measures
that would allow the Navy to continue using MFA sonar while mitigating
the sonar’s effects on marine mammals.159 On remand, the district court im-
posed six injunctive measures160 on the Navy’s use of MFA sonar.161 The Navy
154 NRDC v. Winter, No. 8:07-cv-00335-FMC-FMOx, 2007 WL 2481037, at ∗1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007).
155 Terra Bowling, Supreme Court Says Navy May Continue Sonar Training, SANDBAR, 7:4, Jan. 2009,
http://nsglc.olemiss.edu/SandBar/SandBar7/7.4sonar.htm
156 NRDC v. Winter, supra note 154 at ∗2.
157 Id. at ∗1.
158 Id.
159 William Krueger, Recent Development: In the Navy: The Future Strength of Preliminary Injunctions
under NEPA in Light of Winter v. NRDC, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 423, 432 (2009) [hereinafter Krueger].
160 Six injunctive measures were imposed on the Navy’s MFA sonar: 1. Imposing an exclusionary zone,
covering a distance from the coast to twelve miles, within which MFA sonar could not be used;
2. increasing the amount of monitoring for marine mammals, both during and prior to exercises; 3.
requiring a ten minute monitoring period for helicopters before they deploy “dipping sonar,” 4. restricting
the use of MFA sonar in “geographic chokepoints”; 5. requiring the complete shutdown of MFA sonar
when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of the ship in question; and, 6. requiring that MFA
sonar be powered down by six decibels (dB) when a condition called surface ducting, during which
sound waves travel much farther in water, is occurring. Id.































































appealed two of those injunctive measures: the requirement to shut down the
sonar when a marine mammal is spotted nearby and the requirement to power
down while surface ducting162 where sound waves are able to travel much
farther through water.163
The Navy simultaneously sought relief from the CEQ, claiming that the
injunctions created an emergency exception, and the CEQ granted the Navy’s
application for relief.164 The CEQ waived Navy compliance with NEPA by
approving alternate guidelines for sonar use along the California coast.165 In
early 2008, President Bush signed an Executive Order exempting the Navy
from sonar requirements for California contained in the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act (CZMA).166 The Executive Order also exempted the Navy from
having to complete an EIS under “emergency circumstances.”167
In light of these new developments, the Navy filed an emergency appeal,
and the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal.168 The Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court’s decision that preliminary injunctive relief was
appropriate, but concluded that a blanket injunction prohibiting the Navy from
using MFA sonar was overbroad, and remanded the case to the district court
“to narrow its injunction so as to provide mitigation conditions under which
the Navy may conduct its training exercises.”169 On remand, the district court
issued a new preliminary injunction allowing the Navy to use MFA sonar on
the condition that it implemented mitigation measures.170
On February 4, 2008, the district court invalidated CEQ’s approval of
“alternative arrangements” finding that the Navy was not exempt from NEPA’s
requirements, and denied the Navy’s application to vacate the preliminary
injunction.171 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the
CEQ’s alternative arrangements exceeded the scope of the NEPA’s emergency
exemption and thus were invalid.172
162 The Supreme Court in Winter held that the district court abused its discretion in requiring the Navy to
power down MFA sonar by six decibels when significant ”surface ducting” conditions occur. During
surface ducting conditions, active sonar becomes more useful near the surface and less effective at
greater depths. The Court concluded that because surface ducting is rare and unpredictable, it is
especially important for the Navy to train under these conditions when they occur. See Winter v. NRDC,
slip op. at 20–21.
163 Id.
164 Krueger, supra note 159 at 434.
165 Id.
166 Catherine Mongeon, In Brief: NRDC’s Battle Against the Navy, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 277, 282 (2008)
[hereinafter Mongeon].
167 Id.
168 502 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2007).
169 508 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2007).
170 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–1121 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
171 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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3.2. The Supreme Court Decision
In a much-anticipated opinion, Justice Roberts writing for the Court vacated
the lower court’s injunction, emphasizing the importance of balancing equities
and public interest.173 The Court reasoned that the Navy’s need to conduct train-
ing to respond to national security threats posed by enemy submarines out-
weighed the possibility of harm to marine mammals.174 Quoting from George
Washington’s Annual Address to Congress, Chief Justice Roberts stated, “To
be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.”175
The beginning of Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion set the tone for the
Court’s weighing of interests in Winter and illuminates the main reasoning
behind the Court’s decision to vacate the preliminary injunction on the Navy’s
use of sonar in the case.
The Court articulated three main reasons to support its conclusion. First,
the Court ruled that the lower courts’ standard allowing issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction based only on a “possibility” of irreparable harm is too
lenient.176 Instead, the Court required the use of a precedential standard that
requires demonstration of “irreparable injury likely to happen in absence of
injunction.”177 In the alternative, the Court ruled that even if plaintiffs have
demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury, such injury is outweighed by
the public interest and the Navy’s interest in training its sailors.178
Second, the Court concluded that the balance of equities and consid-
eration of the overall public interest “tip strongly in favor of the Navy.”179
A court is not obligated to grant an injunction as it is a discretionary rem-
edy never awarded as of right.180 Military interests do not always trump other
considerations in this balancing process, but courts must give deference to
the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the importance
of military interest.181 In this case, the Court noted that the record “under-
scored the threat posed by enemy submarines and the need for extensive sonar
training to counter this threat.”182 It emphasized that the training could not be
accomplished under the challenged mitigation restrictions.183
Third, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts’ justifica-
tions for entering the preliminary injunction were not persuasive.184 First, “the
173 129 S Ct. at 367.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 365.





181 Id. (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
182 Id.
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District Court did not give serious consideration to the balance of equities and
the public interest.”185 The lower courts failed to defer to senior Navy officers’
predictive judgments about how the preliminary injunction would reduce the
effectiveness of the training exercises.186 In addition, the lower courts abused
their discretion by requiring the Navy to shut down MFA sonar when a marine
mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel.187 The lower
courts held that this zone would not be overly burdensome because marine
mammal sightings during training exercises are relatively rare.188 However, be-
cause training scenarios can take several days to develop, each shutdown can
result in the loss of several days’ worth of training.189 The Court determined
that the district court also abused its discretion by requiring the Navy to power
down MFA sonar during significant surface ducting conditions.190 Given that
surface ducting is both rare and unpredictable, the Navy must be able to train
under these conditions when they occur.191
The majority decision contains both procedural and substantive flaws.
Procedurally, the Supreme Court inappropriately reversed the case based on
the mere disagreement with the lower courts’ decision. The majority clearly
disagreed with the district court’s conclusions, but under well-established
precedent mere disagreement is not a sufficient basis for reversal. “The clearly
erroneous standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the
finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have
decided the case differently.”192
The majority also failed to apply traditional appellate review standards,
and rejected the district court’s finding of irreparable harm while endorsing
the Navy’s declarations regarding threat to national security.193 The majority
recognized that the case involved “complex, subtle, and professional decisions







191 Id. On June 21, 2010, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of preliminary injunctions in another
NEPA context in Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms. As in Winter v. NRDC, the Court’s analysis again
focused not on the merits of the environmental review but on whether the preliminary injunction that
the district court issued was too broad. In this regard, the Supreme Court concluded that the district
court’s injunction was too broad, holding that the injunction improperly prevented the government from
approving partial deregulation without first complying with full environmental impact review. See U.S.
Supreme Court Issues Decision in Monsanto Case, http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2010/06/21/u-s-
supreme-court-issues-decision-in-monsanto-case/
192 Joel R. Reynolds, Taryn Kiekow, & Stephen Zak Smith, No Whale of a Tale: Legal Implications of
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Yet, the majority failed to recognize—and in so doing ignored Supreme Court
precedent—that district courts are uniquely situated to analyze evidence and
make determinations of fact even as to such complex issues. Nonetheless, the
majority substituted its own judgment without identifying any clear error in
the lower court’s fact finding.195
The Winter decision is also flawed substantively based on the majority’s
“unquestioned deference to an invocation of military necessity at the expense
of the environment.”196 First, the majority’s definition of cognizable harm
made it inevitable that “military interests would prevail in the balance of
conflicting harms and public interests.”197 Further, in “balancing the public’s
interest in national security against its environmental interests,” the Court
rejected the reasoning of the lower courts without laying out a framework for
future decisions.198 Finally, the majority gave “broad deference to Executive
determinations of military necessity, leaving open the possibility that the
Executive will stretch the definition of “emergencies” that trigger a NEPA
exception.”199 As a result, the decision leaves the status of injunctions for
procedural violations of environmental laws by the military in a state of
flux.200
This decision left unanswered the question of whether a court reviewing
an environmental claim can disagree with the military’s assessment of danger
to national security.201 The majority relied on mere assertions that the use of
MFA sonar during training exercises is of the utmost importance to the Navy
and the nation without requiring specific documentation or quantification of
the threat.202 Not only did the Supreme Court disagree with the lower court’s
logic, overturning the holding that infrequency of occurrence made the training
conditions dispensable, but the majority seemed to take issue with the fact
that the lower courts questioned the military’s statements at all.203 Although
courts rarely second-guess military conclusions, they police the outer limits
of claims of military necessity.204
Courts have consistently held that NEPA does not include a military
exception. However, in allowing the CEQ to define “emergency” exceptions
broadly, the Court may have created a de facto national security exception to
195 Id.
196 Lisa Lightbody, Case Comment, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 33 HARV. ENVTL.
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NEPA.205 Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules on Executive meddling
in the future, the Winter decision only increases incentives for the military not
to comply with NEPA.206
While the majority avoided discussing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims,
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent joined by Justice Souter, addressed these issues
directly.207 First, “if the Navy had completed the required EIS before taking
action,” the parties and the public could have benefited from the environmental
analysis—and the Navy’s training could have continued.208 Instead, the Navy
acted first, and thus thwarted the purpose an EIS is intended to serve.209
The dissent then addressed one of the fundamental errors in the ma-
jority’s holding: the military could conceivably avoid complying with NEPA
at all times, if it alleged that compliance will threaten national security.210
Congress has never written a military exemption in NEPA, despite providing
similar exemptions in other environmental statutes.211 While the Navy’s train-
ing exercises are critical, they “do not authorize the Navy to violate a statutory
command, especially when recourse to the Legislature remains open.”212
4. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
The disappointing outcome in Winter v. NRDC is merely one symptom of a
larger disease; namely, the Navy’s ability to dodge environmental law man-
dates in the marine context. A long line of NEPA challenges to Navy sonar has
yielded very limited substantive protections for marine mammals.213 Conse-
quently, the Navy’s use of sonar has proceeded essentially unimpeded for the
past two decades, protected by broad military exemptions from environmental
laws that are supposed to protect vulnerable marine species.
In the wake of Winter v. NRDC, unanswered questions remain that
require solutions at two levels. First, adjustments need to be made to enhance
marine mammal protection within the NEPA framework. Second, outside the
NEPA context, new substantive mandates are necessary to enhance protection
of marine mammals from sonar’s harmful impacts. Adjustments within the
NEPA context will be easier to achieve if proposed substantive protections can
be enacted. In addressing these new substantive protections, national security
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Reynolds et al., supra note 192 at 771.
208 129 S Ct. 356, 387 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 391.
212 Id. at 393.
213 See supra Part 2.1. The most successful of these cases was NRDC v. Evans, which produced an effective
settlement with the Navy that provided substantive protections for marine mammals. See supra notes
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interests and their relationship to environmental protection need to be revisited
as a general matter and, in particular, in the context of Navy sonar’s impacts on
marine mammals. Congress and the federal agencies, not the courts, should
direct the way forward in this re-evaluation of the clash between national
security objectives and the sanctity of the marine environment.
4.1 NEPA’s Applicability to the Marine Context Needs to Be Adjusted
Although NEPA litigation has achieved some success in compelling the Navy
to delay or adjust its use of sonar, NEPA will never be a sufficiently viable tool
for marine mammal protection. This reality cannot be overcome even with the
help of valiant efforts from NRDC and other environmental organizations in
seeking to use NEPA to it fullest potential to combat the Navy’s use of sonar.
The reason for NEPA’s shortcoming in this context is simple: NEPA is not a
marine resource protection statute, and it is ill-suited to be so used. NEPA has
been a weapon of choice in the Navy sonar context largely because the military
has so deftly avoided weak substantive mandates in federal environmental laws
relating to marine mammal protection that NEPA is the only statute available
to afford any form of relief, albeit incomplete, to environmental plaintiffs.
Neither the Navy’s nor the environmental plaintiffs’ ultimate objectives
are served by protracted and costly NEPA litigation, especially given the
“harder questions” associated with balancing national security and environ-
mental protection objectives that remain unresolved in the wake of NRDC v.
Winter. Therefore, to the extent that NEPA remains one of the more viable
options for protection of marine mammals, a system to reconcile the Navy’s
assertion of national security objectives with protection of marine mammals
needs to be established.
Two options have recently been proposed to reconcile these competing
interests under NEPA. One proposal recommends that a national security
exemption be adopted under NEPA to provide guidance for when certain
national security objectives should not have to comply with NEPA’s mandate.
NEPA lacks a national security or national defense exception. The Endangered
Species Act (ESA)214 is the only major substantive environmental statute with
a national security exemption, which was added to the statute in 1978.215 The
exemption requires the Endangered Species Committee to relieve an agency
from ESA requirements when the Secretary of Defense requests such relief
for national security reasons.216
This proposal suggests that a national security exemption under NEPA is
necessary because the extensive and time-consuming EIS process can impair
214 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (2006).
215 Vassar, supra note 21 at 297.
216 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j). As of this writing, the Secretary of Defense has not sought a national security































































military training and activities and fails to provide an adequate balance be-
tween national security and environmental interests.217 “[T]he suffocating na-
ture of NEPA on important national security activities that don’t rise to the
level of an emergency but which require action as a preventative measure . . .
calls for a statutory change to NEPA to give the military flexibility in achiev-
ing and maintaining national security objectives.”218 This national security
exemption under NEPA would involve a review committee for approval of the
exemption.219 While this approach would offer more structure and consistency
than the current ad hoc approach in the courts, it runs the risk of perpetuating
the status quo of extreme deference to military objectives cloaked in the “more
legitimate” clothing of a statutory exemption.
A second proposal suggests that a “uniform national standard” be applied
for determining when and how national defense activities must comply with
environmental standards.220 This approach is preferable to a national security
exemption because it does not proceed from the assumption that national
security objectives are entitled to special treatment. Instead, national defense
and security measures would be evaluated on their own merits on a case-by-
case basis in the same manner as non-military requests.
Apart from these proposals to amend the NEPA framework to address
national defense and security matters, another option is to work with what
is already contained within NEPA: to address the emergency exception itself
and require the military to be held to the same emergency circumstances
standard as any other federal agency. The Supreme Court dodged this issue
in Winter v. NRDC by focusing on the preliminary injunction standard and
the importance of providing deference to national security objectives.221 The
Ninth Circuit in Winter properly construed the emergency exception narrowly,
which was consistent with a line of cases prior to Winter that had interpreted
NEPA’s emergency exception narrowly.222 It seems appropriate to focus on
the emergency nature of the circumstances at issue to justify an exception,
regardless of which federal agency is seeking to fit within its protections. In this
regard, one thing is certain: planned military training exercises are not worthy
of any exception or exemption from NEPA, regardless of their relationship to
promoting national security objectives. In every instance, such activities can
proceed in a manner that is most environmentally protective without harming
national security interests. The foundation for the new environmental ethic
to which then–Secretary of Defense Cheney alluded in 1990223 is available in
217 Id. at 303.
218 Id. at 299.
219 Id. at 305.
220 See Craig, supra note 14 at 376.
221 For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. NRDC, see Part 3.2.
222 See Part 2.2. supra for a discussion of these cases.






























































NEPA, NATIONAL SECURITY, OCEAN NOISE 351
this regard: environmental concerns need to be built into to how the Navy
conducts its sonar training exercises, unless the nation is involved in active
military engagement with enemy forces.
4.2. New and Existing Laws Need to Provide Substantive Protections
to Avoid or Diminish the Impacts of Navy Sonar on Marine Mammals
NEPA has been the weapon of choice by default in many Navy sonar cases.
The reason for this unfortunate reality is that the Navy has been able to bypass
the mandates of federal environmental laws in the name of national security
objectives.224 For example, in the Winter v. NRDC context, the Navy success-
fully dodged compliance with three substantive environmental statutes—the
ESA, MMPA, and CZMA—as well as seeking to avoid the procedural man-
dates of NEPA.
In Winter, the SOCAL area where the sonar tests were being conducted
was home to nine species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA.
The NMFS issued a Biological Opinion under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA,225
which concluded that while the SOCAL exercises might “adversely affect”
certain threatened and endangered species, the exercises were not “likely to
jeopardize the [species’] continued existence.”226 The NMFS also issued an
Incidental Take Statement under which harm to these threatened or endangered
species would be excused under the ESA as “incidental.”227
In addition, in January 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a
National Defense Exemption, which exempted from the requirements of the
MMPA all of the Navy’s military readiness activities employing MFA sonar
for the duration of the SOCAL exercises.228 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
conditioned the exemption on the Navy adopting a number of mitigation
measures, which already had been standard operating procedure in the Navy’s
anti-submarine warfare exercises since 2004.
On January 15, 2008, President Bush signed an executive order exempt-
ing the Navy’s training exercises from compliance with the CZMA.229 On the
same day, CEQ purported to approve “alternative arrangements” for the Navy
to continue its use of MFA sonar while complying with NEPA, reasoning that
“emergency circumstances” prevented normal compliance.230
224 For a helpful discussion of the military’s exceptions and exemptions from environmental law statutes,
see generally Craig, supra note 14. See also David M. Bearden, Exemptions from Environmen-
tal Law for the Department of Defense: Background and Issues for Congress (2007), available at
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/08Jun/RS22149.pdf
225 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
226 NRDC v. Winter, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4504, ∗17 n.11 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2008).
227 Id.
228 See 17 U.S.C. § 1371(f).
229 Mongeon, supra note 166 at 282.































































The Navy’s evasion of federal environmental protection mandates at
issue in the Winter context only tells part of the story. There is a long and
unfortunate history of erosion of species protection under the MMPA and
ESA Amendments.231 However, proposed amendments to the MMPA as of
this writing seek to change that balance.232
The environmental protection measures of the MMPA weakened under
the weight of military readiness objectives.233 Under the 2003 Amendments to
the MMPA, the two types of harassment were redefined for military readiness
activities: “Level A harassment” means an act that injures or has the signifi-
cant potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock; whereas
“Level B harassment” refers to an act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a
marine mammal or marine mammal stock by causing disruption of behavioral
patterns, such as migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or shelter-
ing, to a point where such behavioral patterns are abandoned or significantly
altered. These definitions are much narrower than the general definition of
harassment (applicable to non-military actors), which is an act that
(i) has the potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal
stock in the wild; or
(ii) has the potential to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal
stock in the wild by causing disruption of behavioral patterns, in-
cluding, but not limited to, migration, breathing, nursing, breeding,
feeding, or sheltering.234
In other words, more harm is required for military readiness activities before
they rise to the statutory level of harassment. The military also benefits from
a weaker definition of the “incidental take” requirement as applied to military
readiness activities.
231 For example, Section 318(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108–136)
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to exempt military lands from designation as critical habitat
under the ESA, whereas section 318(b) directs the Secretary of the Interior to consider impacts on
national security when deciding whether to designate critical habitat. Exemptions from Environmental
Law for the Department of Defense, http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/08Jun/RS22149.pdf
Section 319 of P.L. 108–136 authorized a broad exemption from the MMPA for “national defense”
that the Secretary of Defense may invoke in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary
of the Interior, or both as appropriate. Id. Section 319 also amended the definition of “harassment” of
marine mammals, as it applies to military readiness activities, to require greater scientific evidence of
harm, and required the consideration of impacts on military readiness in the issuance of permits for
incidental takings. Id.
232 See Vassar supra note 21 at 290.
233 For a discussion of the weakening of MMPA protections throughout the amendment process in the past
two decades, see generally Elena McCarthy & Flora Lichtman, The Origin and Evolution of Ocean
Noise Regulation under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 13 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1 (2007).
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The military exemption mandates of the National Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 108-136) have been applied in the Navy sonar context.235 Since 2006,
the Secretary of Defense twice has invoked the authority in P.L. 108-136 to
exempt the use of MFA sonar from the MMPA during certain training exercises
and operations. The Secretary invoked the first exemption in June 2006 for
six months,236 and the second in January 2007 for two years.237 The Navy
stated that the longer two-year exemption would allow it to continue critical
training while preparing a comprehensive environmental compliance plan for
its ranges and operating areas.238
In response to these gaping holes in the substantive protections for marine
mammals in key federal environmental statutes, two proposals may promote
enhanced protection of marine mammals from the impacts of Navy sonar. First,
the MMPA needs to be amended in two ways to add a citizen suit provision to
enhance citizen enforcement under the Act and a narrowly tailored national
security exemption like the provision in the ESA. Second, new substantive
protections need to be enacted at the domestic and international levels to
address marine mammal protection.
The MMPA is one of only a few major environmental statutes without
a citizen suit provision.239 The reasons for this omission are unclear but the
effects of this omission are painfully evident. Since the 1970s, citizen suit
provisions have been enormously valuable in promoting citizen enforcement
of environmental laws, and they are more valuable than ever in the post-9/11
era.240 Compared to suits filed under the Administrative Procedure Act, cases
filed under citizen suit provisions are more likely to promote compliance with
substantive mandates by having citizen-plaintiffs serve as private attorneys
general under the Act.241 Because of the congressional blessing that citizen
suits represent for potential plaintiffs to be eligible to sue under these statutes,
citizen suits are less likely to be dismissed on standing and other procedural
235 See David M. Bearden, Exemptions From Environmental Law for the Department of Defense: Back-
ground and Issues for Congress, (May 15, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RS22149.pdf
236 The Department of Defense authorized this exemption after conferring with the Department of Com-
merce.
237 Navy Office of Information, New National Defense Exemption to MMPA Authorized for Navy, Jan. 23,
2007, available at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story id=27415
238 Id.
239 NEPA and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) also lack citizen suit
provisions.
240 See generally James R. May, Now More than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 ELR 10704
(2003).
241 See Reynolds, supra note 35 at 800 (quoting Michael Jasny et al., Sounding the Depths II: The
Rising Toll of Sonar, Shipping, and Industrial Ocean Noise on Marine Life 28 (2005), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sound/sound.pdf (“Congress should add a ‘citizen-suit’ provision
to the MMPA, which would strengthen the authority of the public to do what, in some cases, the































































grounds.242 Moreover, the procedural injuries that plaintiffs typically allege
in MMPA suits are more likely to prevail when brought under a citizen suit
provision. Although far from a guarantee of success, the federal courts and the
Supreme Court have recognized procedural injury as a viable form of injury
under the citizen suit provisions of other environmental laws.243
To enhance protection of marine mammals in the future, substantive
protections are essential at the domestic and international levels. There are
three principal ways in which this goal can be achieved: protect species,
protect habitat, and promote regional and international cooperation on marine
mammal conservation.
With regard to protecting species and promoting international cooper-
ation, a bill to amend the Whale Conservation, Protection, and Study Act
(WCPSA),244 pending before the House of Representatives as of this writing,
would offer valuable substantive protections for whales if enacted by promot-
ing international whale conservation, protection, and research. Perhaps most
significant for the purposes of this article’s analysis, the bill calls for inter-
national cooperation to address the adverse effects of anthropogenic noise on
whales and other marine life, recognizing the importance of military readiness
activities which shall, so far as is reasonable and practicable, be conducted
in a manner consistent with those efforts.”245 This language is a refreshing
shift in priorities compared to the outcome in Winter because it reflects a
presumption in favor of environmental protection goals and mandates that
military readiness activities be conducted in a manner consistent with these
goals. In addition, given the highly migratory nature of whales, promoting
regional and international cooperation is essential for effective management.
In this regard, the bill seeks to “conclude a whale protection Agreement with
the Government of Canada aimed at coordinating and promoting conservation
efforts for whales that migrate through waters of both countries.246 To further
promote regional and international cooperation, the bill also calls for inter-
national marine protected area networks,247 which is a growing trend in other
nations and regions of the world and is an indispensable regulatory tool for
effective management of marine mammals.248
242 Plaintiffs who file suit under citizen suit provisions must still satisfy Article III standing requirements,
however.
243 See Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right Thing and
the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 232–33 (2010).
244 Whale Conservation, Protection, and Study Act, H.R. 2455, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 18, 2009).
245 Id. § 3(f).
246 Id. § 2(b)(3).
247 Id. § 3(g).
248 See generally Randall S. Abate, Marine Protected Areas as a Mechanism to Promote Marine Mammal
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Substantive protections are not limited to a focus on particular species,
however. On January 19, 2010, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA) released a proposed plan to reduce adverse effects on
marine mammals resulting from the Navy’s use of MFA in training exercises.249
The plan calls for the Navy to limit its use of sonar in “hot spots” (important
marine mammal habitat) along the Atlantic coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, and
along the Southern California coast where the use of mid-frequency sonar
endangers whales, porpoises, and dolphins.250 Another habitat-oriented sub-
stantive protection provision in NOAA’s proposed plan involves creating a
“comprehensive sound budget” for the oceans to reduce human sources of
ocean noise and address problem of cumulative impacts.251
A Navy sonar case pending in the Southern District of Georgia as of this
writing illustrates the critical need for these new and enhanced substantive
protections for marine mammals. In January 2010, Defenders of Wildlife and
several other environmental groups filed a lawsuit challenging the Navy’s use
of sonar at a proposed Undersea Warfare Training Center.252 The lawsuit seeks
to protect endangered right whales by compelling the Navy to comply with
NEPA, ESA, and the APA before proceeding with plans for a training range.253
The proposed training center would be located in “an area 500 nautical miles
in size” southeast of the Georgia/Florida border.254 However, the training center
would be not-so-conveniently located adjacent to waters where right whales
give birth to and nurse their calves each year from November to April.255
This case differs from Winter in two important ways. First, there are
other threats in this situation in addition to the impacts of sonar (i.e., right
whales are especially vulnerable to ship strikes because of their size and slow
movement).256 Second, the North Atlantic right whale is listed as critically
endangered under the ESA.257 Even Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
249 Letter from Jane Lubchenco, NOAA Administrator, to Nancy Sutley, Chair, White House Council on
Environmental Quality, Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/docs/100119.pdf
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Complaint, Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy (S.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2010), at para. 1, avail-
able at http://www.southernenvironment.org/uploads/publications/Final complaint - 12810.pdf [here-
inafter Complaint]. See also Whales v. Sonar: NOAA May Limit Sonar Tests, but Another Case
Heads to Court, DISCOVER MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 2010, available at http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/
80beats/2010/02/01/whales-vs-navy-noaa-may-limit-sonar-tests-but-another-case-heads-to-court/
253 Complaint at para. 1.
254 Id.
255 Id. at para. 2. In fact, a right whale calf was born in March 2010 near the proposed site of the
Navy’s training center. See Endangered Right Whale Born Near Proposed Navy Training Site, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/unleashed/2010/03/endangered-right-
whale-born-near-proposed-navy-training-site.html
256 Complaint, supra note 252 at para. 2.
257 The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has described the North Atlantic right whale as one of
“the world’s most critically endangered large whale species and one of the world’s most endangered































































majority in Winter, conceded that the Navy’s national security interests would
not necessarily trump environmental concerns in every case. Therefore, the
Defenders of Wildlife case appears to be the right set of facts to weaken the
applicability of the Winter outcome. Better still, it also serves to underscore
the need to address these clashes between the Navy and marine mammal
protections in a manner outside the NEPA context, and outside the courts
entirely. Substantive protections of species and habitat through measures such
as the proposed amendments to the WCPSA and NOAA’s hot spots program
offer a much better alternative to enhance protection of these vulnerable
species rather than allowing NEPA litigation and the courts to determine their
fate.
CONCLUSION
Joel Reynolds, a senior attorney with NRDC and a veteran of NEPA litigation
challenging Navy sonar for the past two decades, offered these thoughtful
observations about the past and future of balancing the needs of the Navy and
marine mammals:
In each case . . . the district courts have affirmed the principle that, absent an explicit
statutory exemption, those laws apply not just to the rest of us but also to the military
services in their training for our national defense, even in this post 9/11 era. And as
settlement agreements have been achieved in those cases—agreements that allow the
Navy to continue to train but under terms requiring a higher level of environmental
compliance—it has become increasingly difficult to dispute that a balance between
military preparedness and environmental protection is achievable if only there is a
will to achieve it.258
Such a balance between national security and environmental protection is
achievable, but not on an ad hoc basis in NEPA litigation. This article maintains
that striking the proper balance between clashing goals in the marine context
is best achieved through substantive protections for marine mammals. These
protections should be established by Congress and relevant federal agencies,
which is far preferable to another decade of procedural gymnastics under
NEPA as interpreted by a Supreme Court that is more deferential than ever to
military prerogatives. To the extent NEPA remains as one tool within a broader
range of protections for marine mammals from the impacts of Navy sonar,
NEPA’s emergency exception should be the focus for evaluating national
security objectives.
258 Reynolds, supra note 35, at 801.
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